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An Auction Reference Model for Describing and 
Running Auctions 
Daniel Rolli, Andreas Eberhart 
University of Karlsruhe, Germany 
Abstract: With electronic auctions gaining importance, economists have increas-
ingly gotten interested in researching the impact of variations in auction proto-
cols. However, the infinite number of possible auction configurations and the sig-
nificance of details make this a hard and tedious task. Therefore we address the 
issue of comprehensive description both from a conceptual and an implementation 
perspective. Central components that we identify serve as building blocks for an 
Auction Reference Model. We show how the components of the Auction Reference 
Model can be described in order to achieve an overall auction specification and 
how the descriptions are operationalized by a generic auction runtime engine1. 
Keywords: Auction Mechanisms, Auction Reference Model, Markets, Business 
Processes 
1 Introduction 
With the profound prosperity of business-to-business (B2B) procurement plat-
forms [Bapn+01; Prem03], the publicity of government spectrum auctions2 
[VrVo01], and eBay3 as the most prominent of consumer-oriented marketplaces 
uniting both prosperity and publicity, auctions have gained significant importance. 
They have created a lasting impact on the conduct of business in practice as well 
as the disciplines of Economics and Information Systems. A multitude of different 
auction implementations is in practical use and infinite variations exist in theory. 
One major criterion for distinction in the employed auctions is, for example, the 
bidding side of market participants. In B2B procurement a buyer typically initiates 
an auction and potential sellers bid for a decreasing price. On consumer-oriented 
platforms as well as in spectrum auctions it is mostly one seller having several as-
piring buyers bid. Especially on consumer marketplaces rather intuitive auction 
                                                          
1  An alpha version of the software is available for download at  
http://www.iw.uni-karlsruhe.de/auctionrm/ 
2  http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/ 
3  http://www.ebay.com/ 
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types are encountered that often resemble classical types like, for example, the 
English auction4 or Dutch auction5. But particular implementations resembling the 
same traditional auction type may still differ in various aspects. Varying specifics 
sometimes appear as details but can have major impacts on the outcome of the 
auctions. [Roth+02] As market users can be quite explorative and inventive, they 
adapt their behavior to even the smallest features, when provided sufficient incen-
tives. Economists want to systematically analyze the effects of particular rules on 
the market outcome as they have realized the significance of detail. [Neu04] 
However, for economists as well as participants from the business, customer or 
government side, it is difficult to grasp the specification of an auction in its en-
tirety. Not to speak of auction analysis, auction design or appropriate strategy 
derivation. The lack of a coherent method for representing auctions hampers pro-
gress in all of these fields. Systematically tying together all aspects of an auction’s 
structure would enable a comprehensive description of all details and mark the 
stepping stone to tackling many challenges in the auction domain. 
When writing about auctions and the topics related to them we follow the termi-
nology of McAfee and McMillan. According to them “an auction is a market insti-
tution with an explicit set of rules determining resource allocation and prices on 
the basis of bids from the market participants.” [McMc87] As bid is the specific 
term for a message exchanged in auctions, offer is a more general equivalent for a 
market message in trade negotiations [StWe03] that we will also use. 
Autonomous software agents for bidding in auctions exemplify the need and ma-
jor requirements for coherent auction specification. Anthony and Jennings moti-
vate and present an “autonomous agent that can participate in multiple heteroge-
neous auctions” [AnJe03]. They run simulations in an electronic marketplace that 
implements three auction types accessible for the agent. Each type is one particu-
lar embodiment of either the English, Dutch, or Vickrey auction. Multiple in-
stances of the auctions can run concurrently, so there are several auctions avail-
able to the agent at a time. Based on the “intelligent bidding strategy” [AnJe03] 
the agent decides what bid to place in which auction considering its principal’s 
preferences and the characteristics of each auction. Anthony and Jennings state 
that their model and method, which work well on the simulated marketplace, can 
be readily extended to other auction settings. However, they point out: “In terms 
of the practical application of our method, one of the key problems that needs to 
be addressed is how well an agent can assess the type of environment6 it is situ-
                                                          
4  Besides eBay also found on http://auctions.amazon.com, http://auctions.yahoo.com/, 
etc. 
5  See for example http://www.azubo.de/ 
6  Anthony and Jennings use the term environment not in the microeconomic sense as, 
for example, Smith [Smit03] refers to the economic environment. With their 
environment they rather embrace both the institution and economic environment of 
Smith: “There are three types of auctions running in the environment: English, Dutch 
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ated in.” [AnJe03] They state that in contrast to their experiment it will be signifi-
cantly more difficult for an agent to “quickly and accurately determine its envi-
ronment type” in real world scenarios. 
A comprehensive specification of each accessible auction mechanism would en-
able autonomous agents to assess the structure of an auction quickly and accu-
rately as desired. In the software agent setting the three following major require-
ments for description from the auction participant perspective exist. Firstly, for 
software agents to adapt their strategies properly in a setting of arbitrary auctions, 
they require a complete specification comprising every detail. Secondly, as the de-
scription methodology should be the same for every auction an agent potentially 
encounters, it should allow for the specification of every possible auction. Thirdly, 
the description should be machine-readable for direct agent access. 
We address these three issues with an Auction Reference Model (ARM) that con-
tains and connects all details of an auction mechanism. Furthermore, for the bene-
fit of the auction operator the model will support systematic auction implementa-
tion. 
After this introduction we present related work in section 2. Section 3 outlines an 
example auction for subsequent illustration. The presentation and explanation of 
the Auction Reference Model follow in section 4. Section 5 then proceeds from 
the conception to concrete implementation and gradually exemplifies solutions 
with the introduced example auction. We conclude our work with a summary of 
our results in section 6 and give an outlook to future work. 
2 Related Work 
Some research attempts have been made to tackle the shortcomings of auction de-
scription in practice, but none of the following approaches fulfills all of our re-
quirements as we will explain in this section. 
Dividing markets into market phases in order to describe market processes has 
been quite common in the recent years of market research. [Schm+98; Maes+99; 
StWe03] Information, Matching, Allocation and Settlement are, for example, the 
phases Ströbel and Weinhardt [StWe03] identify. The different phases describe 
what a single offer passes through when closing a deal. However, these phases can 
apply independently to different offers of one market at different times. Two par-
ticipants may, for example, be settling a deal, while others are just informing 
themselves about the market. So, in general, these phases are not applicable – 
from a functional perspective – to the state of a whole market itself. 
                                                                                                                                     
and Vickrey. [...] At the start of each auction (irrespective of the type), a group of 
random bidders are generated to simulate other auction participants.” [AnJe03] 
292 D. Rolli, A. Eberhart 
Communication protocols describe the message flow between actors in auctions. 
The Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA)7 presents an agent Interac-
tion Protocol (IP) for the English auction8 and the Dutch auction9. Neumann 
[Neu04] elaborates on this aspect but brings out that IPs remain on the design 
level neglecting many details. 
Parameterization approaches to market description list enumerations of parame-
ters that typically all have to be specified. They are well studied by Wurman et al. 
[Wur+01] and Neumann [Neu04] for auctions and Ströbel and Weinhardt 
[StWe03] for the broader notion of trade negotiations. Since parameterization ap-
proaches remain on a conceptual level [Neu04] and describe a market with a plain 
list of parameter values, the understanding of each parameter’s meaning, function 
and impact, presupposes fundamental knowledge about markets. The reader inex-
perienced with auctions will rely on a lot of external information, since the under-
lying structure of auctions is not contained within the listing. The parameters are 
“one-dimensional” for example the revelation of information – no languages are 
applied. Due to this fact, the number of auctions configurable with parameteriza-
tion on a detailed level is limited, although quite impressive. 
Flow chart descriptions provide a rudimentary functional description of what is 
going on “inside” the auction mechanism.[Rod+97] However, they also remain on 
the design level and only regard one aspect of market description. They roughly 
sketch the outline of mechanisms, but are neither appropriate for thorough theo-
retical analysis nor a sufficient basis for implementation. 
3 Example Auction 
In this section we present an example auction for subsequent illustration. We will 
now outline it in common terminology and amplitude to give a first impression of 
the auction. As it is symptomatic for verbal description not all aspects are consid-
ered in detail. A comprehensive description according to our requirements will 
step by step be introduced throughout the paper. 
The example auction comprises one item to be sold and one negotiable attribute, 
namely the price. It goes a step beyond traditional auction types to gain additional 
                                                          
7  http://www.fipa.org/ 
8  http://www.fipa.org/specs/fipa00031/XC00031F.pdf, Document number: XC00031F, 
Document source: FIPA TC C, Document status: Experimental, Date of this 
status:2001/08/10 
9  http://www.fipa.org/specs/fipa00032/XC00032E.pdf, Document number: XC00032E, 
Document source: FIPA TC C, Document status: Experimental, Date of this status: 
2001/01/29 
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characteristics for illustrating the capabilities of our approach. Therefore, the pro-
vided example combines notions of the English and the Vickrey auction. 
The “English auction part” starts at a fixed point in time. The seller offers a mo-
bile phone of the type “MP1” in the color “ice blue”. She has specified a reserve 
price of 10 Euros. Potential buyers can bid throughout this stage and are continu-
ally informed about the offered price in the highest bid. This part ends, when there 
is no new bid arriving for 5 seconds. 
The “Vickrey auction part” starts immediately after the first part ends. In this stage 
only the three bidders with the highest bids of the first stage are considered. For 
exactly one minute they can submit sealed bids. 
Directly afterwards, winner and price are determined and all participants of the 
auction are informed about the price. Therefore all bids of the first stage and only 
the last one submitted by each of the remaining three participants in the second 
stage are considered. The participant of the bid with the overall highest price of 
both stages wins. She pays the second highest price of all considered bids. 
4 Auction Reference Model 
4.1 Markets and Auctions 
We draw on the notion that “a market is the impartial structured condensation of 
participants’ intentions into exchange agreements.” [Rol+04] What participants 
therefore do is utter their intentions in the market which are the basis for agree-
ments. “An intention represents the smallest closed entity of purpose within a 
market.” [Rol+04] It is characterized by its associated participant, products and 
attributes. An agreement comprises two intentions that concur with each other and 
indicates that the involved participants have committed themselves to exchanging 
the products of the respective intentions. It can be seen as the economic equivalent 
to a fully specified legal contract complying with all formalities. 
A market model then intends to capture the structure that the condensation from 
intentions to agreements follows. The structure is governed by rules – the institu-
tion [Smit03] – that are contained in a market model. Auctions provide a particu-
larly comprehensive set of explicit rules. We will call a market model that con-
tains such a set of auction rules an auction model. Accordingly, the challenge of 
providing the desired comprehensive auction specification is to represent the re-
spective auction model in a coherent and formalizable way. Therefore, we will fol-
low the notion of a Minimal Market Model [Rol+04] and refine its structure to 
meet an auction model’s requirements. 
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The Minimal Market Model (MMM) describes a formalizable minimal set of con-
ditions as a market core. [Rol+04] It claims to contain every condition common to 
all markets in the most compact way and divides markets into two main parts: 
• The statics of the MMM provide the means for fully describing all fixed mar-
ket instance data at any single point in time for any market. 
• The dynamics describe the patterns that occur in the evolution of the static 
market instance data over time. No significant common core was identified for 
the dynamic structures in the MMM, as they are what is individual for each 
market model and disjunctive for the whole of all. 
For all MMM details constitutive for auction description the following subsections 
will subsequently provide thorough explanations in the place where they become 
relevant for the auction model. 
In the context of markets and auctions, there are two kinds of market data. Firstly, 
there is data gathered in the process of an actually running market, a market in-
stance. All of this information constitutes the data basis of a market. As this data is 
represented in instances of concepts from the market model level, we call it mar-
ket instance data. Secondly, there is data describing the market model. We will 
call this market model data. 
This applies analogously to the term of market information. 
For building the Auction Reference Model, we will start with an auction definition 
by Wellman and Wurman: “Technically, the auction mechanism is that part of the 
protocol governing the behavior of the auctioneer, essentially defining the rules of 
interaction, and determination of the result. The entire auction protocol comprises 
the mechanism, plus the behaviors of participating bidders.” [WeWu98] This auc-
tioneer for us is a theoretical notion that represents the mandatory control over the 
rule execution and compliance. What merely counts is that all participants obey 
the rules that are prescribed. This can be ensured by software implementation of 
rules, the traditional auctioneer in person or even mutual control of participants. 
The auction mechanism is what we want to describe in order to seize the character 
of an auction. 
4.2 Architecture of the Auction Reference Model 
To explain and structure auction mechanisms we put them in the context of par-
ticipating bidders and a data basis with auction instance data. Conceptually, the 
data basis is simply a collection of intentions and agreements in whatever way 
they may be represented. A container for collecting and storing this data may be as 
traditional as a proficient human auctioneer’s mind. The requirements for the data 
basis are allowing intention access via the validation component, accepting 
agreements exclusively from the auction flow and storing all this market instance 
data permanently together with timing information. If these basic, common data 
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storage requirements are provided, the individual character of an auction mecha-
nism is fully described by the auction flow. 
These considerations entail the architecture of the Auction Reference Model as 
illustrated in the following Figure 1. 
Auction
Mechansim
Auction
Data
Auction
Participants
agreement
generator
data basis
intention
transition viewvalidation
auction flow
active stage
participant of type 1 (buyer) participants of type 2 (suppliers)
 
Figure 1: Architecture of the Auction Reference Model 
On the bottom of Figure 1 is the data basis that contains the market instance data, 
namely the intentions and agreements of the respective auction. The parallelogram 
in the middle of the picture represents an excerpt of an auction mechanism that 
always consists of stages. There is only one stage active at a time and the sequence 
of stages is controlled by the auction flow. Each stage contains components of the 
four types view, validation, agreement generator and transition that will be ex-
plained in detail in chapter 4.3. At its top, Figure 1 shows participants. Naturally, 
they do not belong to the auction mechanism itself. They are primarily displayed 
for illustrating how views take effect. The middle and right participants are of the 
same type, therefore share the same view and consequently can see the same mar-
ket instance information in the active stage. The participant to the left is of another 
type and therefore can only access another view which implies different informa-
tion visibility for her. The right participant submits an intention that is checked 
positive and forwarded to the data basis by the validation component. 
The following subsection takes a closer look at each component and motivates its 
function and position within the architecture. 
4.3 Structure and Components of the Auction Reference 
Model 
As the Auction Reference Model elaborates on a particular subset of markets, 
namely those with auction mechanisms, it provides far more (dynamic) conditions 
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than the MMM. Therefore the idea of a core that is common to all markets is suc-
ceeded by a more detailed model common to all auctions in its nature. Minimality, 
however, is preserved in the sense of striving for an essential description as com-
pact as possible and consequently eliminating information superfluous to the theo-
retical concept. In this section we take a closer at the compact ARM outlined by 
the architecture in Figure 1 and provide further motivation and a more detailed 
explanation. At first, we address the general issue of a suitable data structure that 
(potentially) remains unchanged for every auction mechanisms. Then we examine 
the structure of stages that combine the auction-specific components view, valida-
tion, agreement generator as well as transition. A closer look at the auction-
specific components follows. Combinations of their various embodiments over the 
different stages form the unique character of each mechanism. 
4.3.1 Data 
The common data basis requirements of intention access from participants via the 
validation, exclusivly accepting agreements from an auctioneer and storage of 
relevant market instance data with timing information have already been intro-
duced. What remains to do for the data component is examining the structure of 
intentions and agreements that constitute the data to be stored. 
Since the MMM is applicable to every type of market, which includes every auc-
tion, and fully specifies all respective static aspects, we can fully adopt its statics 
for the auction setting. According to [Rol+04] a market is characterized by a set of 
intention and agreement instances that change over time. What the statics do is 
capture the nature of both concepts intention and agreement with the following 
basic data structure. 
According to Figure 2 an intention is defined by an associated participant and two 
groups of products, namely incoming and outgoing ones. Incoming products are 
what the participant of the respective intention wants to receive while outgoing 
products are what she is willing to give away in exchange. An intention can be set 
to be binding. This means that it – respectively its participant – is committed to the 
exact fulfillment of the expressed purpose. If it is not binding, it merely reveals 
market information but does not in any way represent commitment nor the will for 
commitment. The forMatching flag of attributes declares that a respective attribute 
is considered when matching the underlying intention with others. An attribute 
that is not forMatching gives information about the respective product, yet it is not 
regarded for the matching. For the context of this paper, it is sufficient to now 
simply state that an agreement connects and comprises two intentions. For further 
explanation on the data structure see [Rol+04]. 
An Auction Reference Model for Describing and Running Auctions 297 
product
name: Name
participant
name: Name
attribute
name: Name
forMatching: Boolean
value
1..*
*
subAttribute1 *
2 *
1
1..*
incomingProduct
1 1
1..* 1..* outgoingProduct
constitutes
intention
binding: Boolean
agreement
has
comprises
describes
 
Figure 2: UML class diagram for data structure of intention and agreement 
So the data basis must be capable of storing information in the sense of this data 
structure. Participants as well as the auctioneer take part in the market refering to 
the same structure for intentions and agreements. For specific purposes, the struc-
ture can be refined, but it is conceptually sufficient for every market and therefore 
also every auction. 
Intentions are a theoretical construct and can practically be communicated in a 
multitude of different ways, for example by raising one’s hand in a real-life Eng-
lish auction. In a real-life setting the intention per se is, of course, not visible, but 
still precisely defined in the context of the market model and the history of preced-
ing intentions. 
For the determination of auction results as well as for views it must be recogniz-
able when intentions and agreements appear in the market. This can be provided 
for by keeping timestamps for their market entry. Time aspects are also crucial for 
the start and end of auction stages, especially when referring to them with the 
views. Therefore, the information of when a stage was active must also be kept in 
the data basis. 
4.3.2 Stage 
An auction always consists of several stages. Every stage contains embodiments 
of the four components view, validation, agreement generator and transition, 
which are defined as follows. There is exactly one stage active at any time of the 
auction and as it is active each stage merely activates the components it contains. 
The order in which the stages are executed is determined by the auction flow. 
4.3.3 View 
The MMM does not limit the visibility of market instance data by any means, as 
there are no respective restrictions common to all markets. However, we already 
mentioned that it is crucial in particular markets, especially auctions, to express 
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that not every market participant will be granted the rights to see all market in-
stance data at any time. To account for the restricted subjective perspective of par-
ticipants, we provide the concept of views. In each stage there can be any number 
of views greater or equal to zero. A simple example for systematic implementation 
of data subjectivity is only providing the number of all participants who have 
submitted bids to an auction up to a certain point in time instead of revealing their 
names to a buyer.  
Typically, a view is not unique for only one participant but rather a group. There-
fore views are usually assigned to types of participants. With the exception of ex-
ternal events, views solely operate on the market instance data including the tim-
ing information for intentions, agreements and stages. In addition to the visibility 
for participants, the three remaining component types validation, agreement gen-
erator and transition rely on views. 
One crucial difference between the known parameterization approaches and the 
ARM becomes apparent at this point. The extensive parameter set of the Montreal 
Taxonomy [StWe03] contains, for example, parameter 9.f) information content. It 
can have one of two values: 
• unrestricted means “all elements of the winning offer, such as price quotes or 
constraints, are revealed” [StWe03] 
• selected means “only selected offer or status information (e.g. only quality but 
no price information) is provided by the electronic negotiation medium” 
[StWe03] 
While this parameter does add to the description of a trade negotiation, in particu-
lar an auction, it is not comprehensive in the sense of our requirements. The poten-
tial revelation of related information such as the number of bids submitted is ne-
glected but could easily be solved by adding more parameters. What is, however, 
beyond the scope of parameterization is enabling the precise specification of what 
selected information exactly is provided to which participant. 
4.3.4 Validation 
One validation component exists in every stage. Througout the whole duration of 
the stage it belongs to, it checks if incoming participant intentions are valid for the 
respective auction (stage) or not. In case they are, the intentions are stored in the 
data basis; otherwise they are discarded. The validation typically relies on views. 
It may, for example, retrieve the current highest price from a view and compare it 
to the price indicated in a new intention in order to store the intention only if its 
price is higher than the currently leading one. 
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4.3.5 Agreement Generator 
Each stage contains zero or more agreement generators. An agreement generator is 
the only entity that can produce an agreement which is done at the very beginning 
of the stage the agreement generator belongs to. In order to construct every 
agreement in compliance with the introduced data structure, a template according 
to the agreement structure is taken and the intention parts filled out basing on 
views. One such view might deliver the first seller intention of the example auc-
tion, which the agreement generator would then add to the agreement structure. 
4.3.6 Transition 
Exactly one transition is part of every stage. Its purpose is to end the stage it be-
longs to according to a certain condition. Such a condition can either base on 
views, a timer or a combination of both. A very simple example is a transition that 
incorporates a timer and waits for precisely one minute to then end its stage. 
4.3.7 Auction Flow 
There is exactly one auction flow for every auction. With elements from business 
process theory, respectively workflow theory, it controls the order of an auction’s 
stages. Therefore we need the concepts of coordinating stages in sequence and in 
loops with break conditions. Once a stage is finished by its transition the auction 
flow determines the next stage to be activated. Every stage is started immediately 
after the proceeding one ended. In case of our example auction all stages are exe-
cuted in sequence. 
4.4 Description of the Example Auction 
In order to illustrate the use of the ARM for description, we apply its ideas to the 
example auction introduced in section 3. 
The example auction is built on a data basis with the presented common require-
ments, namely validated intention access for participants, only accepting agree-
ments from an auctioneer and storage of relevant market instance data including 
timing information. 
We do not consider the specification of the product that is sold in the example 
auction as part of the mechanism description. The product is rather contained in 
the first intention the auctioneer considers, namely the seller intention. The auc-
tion flow coordinates four stages in sequence.  
The first stage does not provide any views to participants. It is started and ends at 
fixed points in time. The validation of stage one accepts intentions of the follow-
ing kind: they must be declared binding, specify one incomingProduct money with 
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one attribute currency that is forMatching and another attribute amount that is an 
interval ranging from a defined positive number – including null – to infinity. Fur-
thermore one outgoingProduct must be specified.  
In our example the first intention of this kind defines the currency of the money as 
“Euros” and the amount as “10...*”. The outgoingProduct is a mobile phone with 
the forMatching attributes type set to “MP1” and color to “ice blue”. Such an in-
tention is often specified on the webpage of an auction platform provider via input 
fields. For our example, however, we will regard it as a message complying with 
the intention structure. 
The validation of the second stage only accepts buying intentions that match the 
initial seller intention. All these intentions must be binding, have the incoming-
Product equaling the outgoingProduct of the seller intention, specify as their out-
goingProduct money with the same currency of the incomingProduct of the seller 
as well as offer an amount higher than the lower limit of the seller interval and the 
highest submitted bid amount so far. For determining the latter the validation 
makes use of a view that provides this leading price. An identical view is provided 
to the potential seller, all bidders and anyone interested in the auction. This view 
selects the buying intention with the highest amount and returns this amount – the 
current leading price. The transition also keeps track of this view and ends the first 
stage when there has been no change in the delivered value for 5 seconds. 
The third stage also provides one view. This view returns the participants with 
the three highest bids in the second stage. It is accessible for everyone who has 
submitted intentions in the first and second stage to let them know whose inten-
tions are regarded in stage three and whose not. The validation accepts buying in-
tentions only from these participants – three or less. Neither seller nor any buyers 
see what intentions are submitted during this stage as they have no view assigned 
concerning current market instance data. The respective transition ends stage three 
exactly one minute after it started. 
The fourth stage is the stage where an agreement is generated. The agreement 
generator of stage four selects the last intention submitted by each of the three or 
less allowed participants in stage three. From the latter intentions plus all the ones 
from the second stage, the agreement generator selects the participant of the one 
with the highest amount as the winner. This participant can access the view that 
delivers the winner result and is there informed that she wins. The second-highest 
amount of the latter intentions is selected and provided by a view accessible for 
everyone as the price to be paid. Based on views, the agreement generator gener-
ates an agreement that connects two intentions: one is the original seller intention 
with its amount concretized to the price to be paid in the auction; the second is the 
winner intention with its amount adapted also to this price. A transition ends stage 
four at the time when the information provided by the views visible to participants 
is not meant to be offered anymore. 
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In the following section we introduce methods on how to declaratively specify all 
this auction information. 
5 Description Methods and Implementation Example 
In this section, we outline our approach to the individual description of the com-
ponents and explain the respective choice of technologies for the prototype devel-
oped. Furthermore, implementation details as well as a discussion of the design 
and architecture applied are presented to illustrate the first proof-of-concept im-
plementation of the auction runtime engine we developed. 
Our vision is to provide a market engineer with the freedom to specify all aspects 
of a market without being hampered by technological constraints and without be-
ing dependent on costly and time-consuming implementation efforts. The para-
digm of Model Driven Architecture (MDA) seems to be applicable to achieve this 
goal. Rather than simply coding a solution, MDA suggest to generate code from 
abstract models. Since the components introduced in the previous section allow 
specifying auctions in their entirety, we are able to avoid manual coding. Instead, 
the user can specify various aspects of the auction at a higher level of abstraction. 
5.1 System Overview 
The implementation architecture closely follows the conceptual architecture of the 
Auction Reference Model depicted in Figure 1. The concrete realization is shown 
in Figure 3.  
The runtime hosts the auction and handles low level threading, communication, 
and timing issues. Inside, the central component handles the action flow, the stage 
transitions, and the agreement generation. The respective logic is captured in a 
Java class, which is generated from a BPEL script. The idea behind this setup is 
that the designer only needs to use a restricted set of directives. Therefore, BPEL 
is expressive enough for representing the respective information. A key advantage 
of BPEL is the availability of graphical design tools that allows to visually model 
the process. The script accesses the data and auction stage information via the 
views. The participants are shown on the right. We developed a simple GUI (for a 
screenshot refer to the website), which is mostly used for testing. The communica-
tion is carried out via RMI and flows both ways. The market offers the following 
services: 
public interface Server { 
    public void placeBid(Intention i); 
    public Object query(String attribute); 
} 
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Figure 3: System Architecture 
The first method allows transmitting an intention. The method query is used to 
obtain information about the state of the auction. Typical examples are the current 
highest bid, the auction’s stage, or the time remaining until the next stage is 
reached. 
At the moment, the participants can only receive simple text messages sent from 
the market: 
public interface Participant { 
    public void receive(String msg); 
} 
5.2 Structure and Components 
This section picks up the structure and components introduced in section 4 and 
explains their technical realization. 
5.2.1 Data 
The core data structures are directly derived from the UML Model shown in 
Figure 2. The auction history stored in the data repository is a list of intentions. 
Note that the arbitrary attribute structure is not supported at the moment. We cur-
rently use a single product attribute. The data repository is a simple Java Class, 
which persists its information in a relational database. 
A central design principle of the data basis is that it behaves like a recording of the 
auction. Therefore, no value gets changed or deleted in retrospect. Intention struc-
tures arriving from participants are inserted into the repository. The possibility of 
intention deletion is not required, since the withdrawal of offers is not accounted 
for in our example auction. Update or modification of intentions – as it can happen 
in both the second and third stage of the example auction – is possible by sending 
a new valid intention. All necessary calculations are performed via the view 
mechanism outlined in section 5.2.3.  
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5.2.2 Stage 
In addition to the list of intentions, we keep the stage information by remembering 
the points in time, when the auction finished one stage and moved to the next. In 
general, every timestamp is created by the data repository upon insertion of the 
respective entry. This mechanism allows the system to determine which stage an 
intention or agreement belongs to.  
5.2.3 Views 
The previous sections mentioned that no intermediate information is needed for 
auction execution in the model. Views are the perfect vehicle for achieving this 
goal and are created to satisfy the information need of the auction. Consider the 
following example from our auction scenario. Recall from subsection 4.4 that par-
ticipants considered in the third stage are those having submitted one of the three 
highest bids in the second stage. This information is needed to inform every par-
ticipant from the second stage about these three considered participants and it is 
reused for incorporation into the overall winner and price determination in stage 4. 
This computation is performed as follows: 
history.getIntentionsOfStage(2). 
  sortByProdInAmountDesc().getFirstI(3) 
Starting from the entire history, i.e. all intentions received, we get the intentions of 
the first stage. getIntentionsOfStage is a view which transforms a list of 
intentions into another list of intentions by filtering intentions from other stages. 
The resulting set is sorted in descending order by price. Finally, the top three in-
tentions are selected. The views themselves are simple Java methods like the fol-
lowing: 
public IntentionList getIntentionsOfStage(int stage) { 
    IntentionList res = new IntentionList(); 
    for (int i=0; i<this.size(); i++) 
        if (this.getIntention(i).stage == stage) 
            res.add(this.getIntention(i)); 
    return res; 
} 
5.2.4 Validation 
Validation is performed for both auction services. When the query service is in-
voked, validation needs to make sure that no confidential information is issued to 
the caller. The following example shows the validation rule stating that the highest 
price is not accessible in stage 3: 
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if (history.getStage() == 3) 
    if (attribute.equals("HighestBid")) 
        throw new AccessControlException( 
                          "current price is hidden"); 
Validation rules for submitting intentions make sure that incoming and outgoing 
products match, that the bids are high enough, and so on. 
5.2.5 Agreement Generator 
The job of the auction system is to match intentions into agreements according to 
the rules of the market. Consequently, every time an agreement is reached, it 
needs to be recorded. In our case this happens by calling the create-
Agreement functionality from the respective position in the flow. 
5.2.6 Transition 
Similar to the agreement generator, advancing the stages is performed as part of 
the flow logic by grouping the flow into so-called BPEL scopes, which correspond 
to the stages. 
5.2.7 Flow 
The history in the database and the views are already capable of representing sev-
eral aspects of an auction. However, the logical flow of auctions is the main part 
that orchestrates the other components into one coherent auction. The following 
list illustrates the tasks that need to be done for this: 
• Advance stages As was mentioned before, auction stages are an important 
mechanism for structuring auctions and need to be defined in the flow. 
• Define timeout Auctions advance to the next stage if a given timeout expires. 
Timeouts can also be adjusted upon events such as the arrival of a new bid. 
• Conditional flows The auction flow can contain conditional statements. These 
conditions regulate the transition from one stage to another. There is a choice 
of modeling behavior via policies or by explicitly checking the condition 
within the flow. 
• Query Information Over the lifetime of an auction, participants can query in-
formation. This activity is for in our case provided by the views. However, the 
availability of the views in the different stages is controlled by the validation. 
• Receive Intentions The auction can receive intentions at various stages. 
• Propagate information Pushes messages to participants. 
• Generate agreements The ultimate goal of any market. 
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We tie all these tasks together with BPEL. Since the possibility of designing flows 
graphically seemed very appealing, we decided to use the Collaxa BPEL designer. 
After the flow is stored in the BPEL XML format, our BPEL2Java tool parses the 
flow and generates Java code from it. Obviously not all constructs available in the 
tool are supported and we restrict ourselves to the tasks shown above. The follow-
ing text illustrates, how these tasks can be represented in BPEL and how the re-
sulting XML is converted to Java. 
 
Figure 4: Sample auction in the Collaxa BPEL designer 
Auction stages can be captured using BPEL scopes. A scope is very similar to a 
block in object-oriented languages. Consequently, a scope can have its own excep-
tion and event handling. Timeouts and deadlines are natively supported by BPEL 
and are treated as events. In our case, the timeout event handler does not do any-
thing but simply advance to the next stage in the sequence of stage scopes. The 
wait deadline is captured in the internal variable timeout, which can be changed 
by an assignment. Figure 4 shows an example. During auction stage two, the expi-
ration time is postponed every time another intention is received. In stage one a 
single receive activity is used to obtain the initial seller intention. Stage two uses 
the while construct in combination with a timeout. 
On the XML level, part of the flow shown in figure BPEL looks as follows: 
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<sequence> 
   <scope name="scope 1"> 
      <receive name="receive seller intention"/> 
   </scope> 
   <scope name="scope 1"> 
      <eventHandlers> 
         <onAlarm until="timeout"/> 
      </eventHandlers> 
      <while condition="true" name="wait for timeout"> 
         ... 
The corresponding Java code is structured very similarly. The method 
nextStage increments an internal counter and registers the time of the transi-
tion. The call to receiveBid can optionally contain the timeout point. 
receiveBid(); 
nextStage(); 
try { 
   while (true) { 
      receiveBid(timeout); 
      timeout = now() + timeout; 
   } 
} catch (Timeout t) {} 
nextStage(); 
6 Conclusion and Outlook 
After presenting the ARM architecture, we explained its components on a concep-
tual level. Means to declaratively represent each component‘s embodiment were 
discussed and chosen in a way that easily makes possible the implementation of a 
generic auction runtime engine. For demonstrating the feasibility we described 
and provide a prototypical example10. 
The ARM structures and conceptually separates the aspects of an auction that are 
often intertwined in auction theory. It is consequently reduced to the minimal in-
formation required for comprehensive auction description and therefore very 
compact. 
To demonstrate the ARMs versatility, our future work will provide specifications 
for other types of auctions like, for example, double-sided continuous and combi-
natorial ones. Several technical aspects of the system will also be improved. A 
                                                          
10  http://www.iw.uni-karlsruhe.de/auctionrm/ 
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Web Service interface, supporting information push, hot deployment of auctions, 
and better tool support would be desirable. We are also investigating using Se-
mantic Web technologies like RDF, Ontologies [Sta+04], and rule languages 
[Bol+01] in order to encode domain knowledge about auctions as such and also the 
goods being traded into the system in a declarative way. An overall migration to 
the Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) [Erl04] and XML-storage technology is 
considered in order to support these plans and take declarative representation to 
the next level. 
The ultimate goal would be to leverage the declarative auction descriptions on the 
client side. It appears possible to use this information in order to create a more ge-
neric auction client that is capable of participating not only in the auction type it 
was designed for, but can also deal with variations thereof. 
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